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Abstract 
The political economy of multilateral aid funds* 
 
 
In 2014 over $60 billion was mobilized to help developing nations mitigate cli-
mate change, an amount equivalent to the GDP of Kenya. Interestingly, breaking 
from the traditional model of bilateral aid, donor countries distributed nearly 
fifty percent of their aid through multilateral aid funds (OECD, 2015). In this pa-
per, we show that by delegating aid spending to an international fund, donor 
countries mitigate a “hold-up" problem that occurs when donor countries are 
tempted to allocate aid based on, say, a regional preference. That is, under bilat-
eral aid, donor-country bias decreases the incentive of recipient countries to in-
vest in measures such as good governance that increase the effectiveness of aid. 
By delegating allocation decisions to a fund, however, donor countries commit to 
allocating aid via centralized bargaining, which provides recipient countries with 
an increased incentive to invest. Additionally, we show that allocating funding by 
majority rule further increases recipient-country investment, since higher in-
vestment increases the probability that a recipient's project will be selected by the 
endogenous majority coalition, and detail conditions under which majority is the 
optimal voting rule. 
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The 2015 Paris Agreement set a goal of mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 to
help developing nations mitigate climate change. Already, donor countries distributed
over $60 billion in climate change aid in 2014 – roughly equivalent to the total amount
of development assistance provided by the World Bank for the same year (OECD, 2015,
World Bank, 2015). Rather than being centralized under one institution, climate change
aid is administered by a variety of different funds with different institutional rules: cur-
rently, at least nine multilateral funds have been established, such as the Green Climate
Fund (pledged budget: $10.2 billion) and the Least Developed Countries Fund ($964 mil-
lion), as well as several bilateral aid funds, such as the UK’s International Climate Fund
($6 billion; Nakhooda et al., 2015).
In this paper, we analyze the optimal design of international aid spending, while
taking into consideration the autarchic environment of foreign aid. In particular, we focus
on the link between the institutional setup governing the distribution of aid to developing
countries, and the incentives of the recipient countries to invest in reforms that increase
the effectiveness of aid spending. As emphasized by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon,
“corruption has disastrous impacts on development when funds that should be devoted
to schools, health clinics and other vital public services are instead diverted into the
hands of criminals or dishonest officials” (2015). That is, a successful development aid
program requires more than just transfers from donor to recipient countries – it also
requires reducing corruption and promoting good governance in the recipient countries.
Unfortunately, in practice, implementing such change is not always high up on recip-
ient governments’ agendas. In fact, the very nature of corruption suggests that recipient
governments may not find it in their best interest to invest in reforming their local polit-
ical and economic systems to ensure maximal impact of the aid money they receive. To
incentivize needed investments and reforms, a new wave of aid conditionality - political
conditionality - has emerged (see Molenaers et al. (2015)).
However, ex ante conditional aid suffers from a problem of non-contractibility – mea-
sures of good governance are partially subjective, and donor countries often face an ex
post incentive to circumvent conditionality (for example, Stone, 2004 documents that
countries with strong ties to the US are less likely to face sanctions for violating IMF
conditionality). This results in a “hold-up” problem, know as the Samaritan’s dilemma,
faced by donor nations: if the donor country cannot commit to giving aid only conditional
on reform investment efforts, the recipient country, knowing it will receive assistance in
any case, has no incentive to implement costly reforms (see Mosley et al., 1995 and Ped-
ersen, 1996 for a discussion of problems of time-inconsistency in aid spending).
While traditional (ex ante) aid conditionality is largely deemed to have failed (see
Collier, 1997 and Dreher, 2009; in fact, Alesina and Weder, 2002 find no evidence that
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higher aid has resulted in lower corruption), experts have expressed more hope for reward-
ing countries for successful reform ex post (see, for example, Svensson, 2003). However,
as shown by O¨hler et al. (2012) in the case of a US aid program, instituting ex post condi-
tionality is difficult in a bilateral setting, since it faces the same problems of credibility as
ex ante conditionality. Here, we argue that the institutional setup of aid funds can help
mitigate the Samaritan’s problem. Specifically, the incentive structure faced by recipient
countries depends on whether donor countries choose to disseminate aid through bilateral
collaborations between donor and recipients, or to participate in multi-lateral aid funds.
We argue that it is precisely the process of preference aggregation that enables mul-
tilateral organizations to better implement aid conditionality. How funds are allocated
is determined in a bargaining process between representatives of the different donating
nations, whose preferences over aid allocation might differ; the bargaining outcome thus
has to reflect a compromise between them.
The bargaining position of each donor will depend in part on the weight they place
on allocating funding to their favored countries, but importantly, it also depends on the
reform investments of the potential recipient nations. Intuitively, the more a recipient
country invests in reforms, the better the bargaining position of donor countries lobbying
on its behalf. This constitutes a new strategic reason for pooling resources in large aid
funds rather than implementing aid bilaterally: when resources are pooled, competition
among recipient countries over aid intensifies since, despite the heterogeneity of donor
country preferences, bargaining results in an allocation that favors spending on efficient
projects. That is, allocating funding via an international fund functions as a commitment
to reward recipient countries for higher investments, thus overcoming the holdup problem.
Despite this strategic advantage of multinational aid funds over bilateral aid, our
model shows that a donor’s decision whether to join the fund rather than to give aid bi-
laterally is still not always straight-forward. After all, donors surrender control over their
aid budget to a bargaining outcome, which may reduce the relative utility they receive
from aid spending. How this trade-off resolves depends crucially on the composition of
donor countries in the fund. Generally speaking, the more asymmetric they are in terms
of the weight they place on allocating aid to their favored recipients, the less valuable a
potential partnership becomes for one of the parties.
In addition to characterizing how international aid funds mitigate the Samaritan’s
problem, we demonstrate that the recipient countries’ incentive to invest in reform is also
a function of the decision rule used within the fund. Specifically, we explore the optimal
voting rule and show that majority rule further increases the incentive for the recipient
countries to invest, since higher investment increases the probability that a recipient’s
project is selected by the endogenous majority coalition. However, the higher incentive
to invest comes at a cost of limiting the total number of projects that are funded, which
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implies that a majority rule will only outperform unanimity when the utility benefit of
investment to the donor countries is relatively low.
Our paper’s main contribution is to the literature on aid conditionality (see Dreher,
2009 and Molenaers et al., 2015 for an overview). We are not the first to suggest that
transferring the responsibility for allocating aid to international organizations or funds
may alleviate the Samaritan’s dilemma. Most notably, Svensson (2000) has put forward
the idea that if donor countries are lacking a commitment technology for implementing
aid sanctions, “delegation of part of the aid budget to an (international) agency with less
aversion to poverty [will] improve [the] welfare of the poor” (p.61). However, the argument
we present here is quite different – instead of assuming the international organizations
have preferences that are more conducive to aid conditionality, we show how the incentive
for recipient countries to invest in reform arises endogenously from the bargaining process
over the allocation of the fund’s budget.
Our work also contributes to the literature on optimal decision rules in international
organizations (see Harstad (2005), Maggi and Morelli (2006), and Barbera and Jackson
(2006)). In particular, our results regarding the optimal voting rule in international funds
are closely related to Harstad (2005), who shows how a majority rule can mitigate a holdup
problem in a setting where investments by members of a club (or countries in a union)
are expropriated ex post. A key difference in our findings, however, is that majority
rule is not always optimal for donor countries, even though the costs of investments are
fully borne by the recipient countries. Instead of simply choosing the decision rule that
maximizes investments, unanimity rule may be optimal in our setting because it ensures
that all recipient countries projects receive some level of funding, whereas majority rule
increases investment precisely by limiting funding to a strict subset of projects.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents the baseline model, and the analysis
is contained in section 2. Section 3 goes on to characterize the optimal voting rule within
the international aid fund, and section 4 concludes. Formal proofs for all results are
presented in the appendix.
1 Model
There are two donor countries and two recipient countries, denoted as i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2
respectively.1 Each donor country has an individual budget for international aid xi = x
to allocate across a set of recipient country aid projects, {g1, g2}.
1For simplicity, we consider a baseline model of only two countries – while the main insights of the model
remain unchanged with more countries, the comparative statics are difficult to characterize with n > 2.
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Preferences and Actions
Donor countries initially choose whether to commit their budget to an international aid
fund (fi = 1) or to retain control over the allocation of their budget (fi = 0). If one of
the donor countries chooses bilateral aid (fi = 0) then, in the last stage of the game, each
country simultaneously chooses how to allocate x over {g1, g2}. However, if both donor
countries choose fi = 1, then the international aid fund allocates the full budget, 2x,
over {g1, g2} via Nash Bargaining (NB) between the donor countries. In the bargaining
process, each country has an equal bargaining weight, and the fund has access to utility
transfers.2
Each donor country assigns different utility-weights on aid spending across the recip-
ient countries, represented by the vector {βij}. These weights could for example reflect
preferences due to geographical proximity, trade relations or historical ties. In addition to
the donor country weights, each recipient country has a “quality-weight,” of αj = 1 + δj.
One may for example think about governance structures that impact the effectiveness of
aid. Each recipient country can influence its own quality weight by investing in δj ≥ 0
according to the cost function c(δj) = (δj+1)
2−1 or, equivalently, c(αj) = (αj)2−1. This
structure can be interpreted as each project having a minimum quality level of αj = 1,
above which active investment by the recipient countries is required to improve project
quality. Investment, however, is observable but non-contractible, which implies only a
limited scope for donor countries to condition allocations on investments.
Donor countries have preferences over the set {gj} that are increasing and concave.
Specifically, we assume
ui({gj, αj, βji }) =
∑
j
αjβ
j
i
√
gj + λ
j
iδj.
Note that while donor countries do not directly take into account the utility recipient
countries receive from their aid spending, we do allow for the possibility that donor coun-
tries may value δj independently from its impact on the quality of the project, reflected in
the term λjiδj (we refer to this as the indirect benefit of investment). The main insights
of our model do not rely upon this feature and, unless explicitly stated, all results go
through with λji = 0 ∀ i, j. However, given that good governance in recipient countries
is a common policy goal of donor countries (as discussed in the introduction), and since
recipient country investments may have spillover effects to other policy areas, we find it
relevant to account for donor countries’ preferences for, say, decreased corruption.
2Utility transfers ensure that donor countries split the utility surplus equally – without utility transfers,
the NB results in an outcome that balances efficiency (aggregate utility) and equity (see Simon and
Valasek, 2016 for more detail). Therefore, our main results remain qualitatively similar even without
utility transfers.
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Recipient countries have linear preferences over aid spending gj:
uj(gj, δj) = gj − ((δj + 1)2 − 1) ≡ gj − ((αj)2 − 1).
Note that recipient countries only value the direct spending in their own country whereas
donor countries may also value spillovers from projects they do not fund themselves. For
this analysis, however, we assume that βji = 0 for i 6= j and βii = βi > 1, and that λji = 0
for i 6= j and λii = λ. This introduces stark heterogeneity between donor countries in
terms of their preferences across recipient countries (each donor country cares only about
one specific recipient country) and allows for differences in valuations of aid in general (if
βi 6= βk). These restrictions allows us to clearly illustrate the main points of the model.
With the simplifying assumptions, each donor nation’s utility function becomes:
ui(αi, gi) = αiβi
√
gi + λδi. (1)
Timing and Equilibrium:
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Donor countries choose whether to allocate aid bilaterally or join their resources in
an aid fund (fi).
2. Recipient countries choose investment levels, δj (αj).
3. Aid is allocated either bilaterally - i.e. each donor country chooses gi ≤ xi - or
centrally - i.e. donor countries bargain a´ la Nash over {gi} with
∑
gi ≤
∑
xi.
The equilibrium we utilize is analogous to sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, with
the exception that, if the donor countries choose to join their resources in an aid fund,
the allocation decision is determined via NB.
Throughout the analysis, we consider the objective of the donor countries, rather than,
say, an objective of maximizing aggregate utility. We argue that this is a natural objective
to consider when analyzing the political economy of international aid funds. However,
this does not imply that investments carried out by the recipient countries’ should be
considered as non-productive for the population of these countries: while we assume that
investment in good governance is costly for the regime of the recipient country, it is
possible that these reforms provide utility benefits to the recipient countries’ population
by increasing the effectiveness of the public sector.
2 Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction, and thus begin with the allocation decisions.
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2.1 Allocation of aid
In the last step, donor countries decide how to allocate the aid budget to the set of
projects {g1, g2}. They may decide not to spend (all of) the budget, but cannot at this
point reverse their decision on whether to allocate bilaterally or jointly through a fund.
Bilateral allocation
If countries have chosen to bilaterally allocate their aid budget, each donor country i
solves
max
{g1,g2}
αiβi
√
gi (2)
s.t. g1 + g2 ≤ x (3)
Lemma 1
Irrespective of the level of αi, each donor country i will spend all of its budget in recipient
country i, i.e. gi = x.
This result already eludes to the samaritan’s dilemma donor countries face when
allocating their aid budget bilaterally: Donors will always spend all their aid money,
irrespective of the level of reform effort their target nation decides to implement. Even
though they are free to reduce aid spending, their preferences make it impossible to
effectively commit to such conditionality.
Joint fund
If donors have decided to allocate their aid budgets through a joint fund, at this stage
they bargain over the allocation of the aggregate budget to the set of recipient country
projects. Since utility transfers are possible, the Nash bargaining outcome maximizes the
sum of utilities of the bargaining parties:3
max
{gi}ni=1
∑
i
αiβi
√
gi (4)
s.t. g1 + g2 ≤ 2x (5)
Note that the indirect utility benefit of recipient-country investment is not factored into
the NB outcome, since λδi is independent of the allocation decision (i.e. the indirect
utility benefit of investment is part of each donor country’s outside option).
The NB outcome implies the following lemma:
3A complete description of the NB outcome would include utility transfers; however, since there is no
need to refer to them directly, we simplify the notation by not explicitly introducing the utility transfers.
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Lemma 2
The fund will also spend the complete budget irrespective of the levels of αj, i.e. g1+g2 =
2x. The division of funds, however, does depend on the levels of reform investments:
gi =
(αiβi)
2
(α1β1)2 + (α2β2)2
2x (6)
Unlike with bilateral aid allocation, the share of the total aid budget that each target
nation receives is sensitive to its investment in αj.
Since utility transfers are possible, donor countries share the created surplus equally,
i.e. they each receive:
ui =
1
2
∑
i
αiβi
√
gi. (7)
2.2 Investment decisions
Recipient countries move simultaneously when deciding their investment levels αj (for
convenience, we refer to recipient countries setting αj, rather than δj, subject to the
constraint that αj ≥ 1). They also know the mechanism by which aid will be allocated
(bilaterally or through a fund) and thus take into account how their share of aid will
change with the investment they make.
Each recipient country chooses αj to solve:
max
αj
{
gj({αk}nk=1)− (α2j − 1)
}
. (8)
Bilateral aid
When aid is allocated bilaterally, recipient countries know that the donor who prefers to
allocate aid to their project will do so irrespective of investments in α. That is, recipient
countries solve problem 8 with gj = x.
Lemma 3
When aid is allocated bilaterally, recipient countries do not invest in reforms beyond the
minimum level, i.e. αj = 1 for all j.
This is a classic hold-up problem (aid allocation does not increase to reflect the
increased investment). A minimum level of α is guaranteed to be implemented. Beyond
that, donor countries face significant difficulties to actually implement aid conditionality
when allocating aid bilaterally.
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Aid fund
Here the recipient countries internalize the effect their reform efforts have on the final
allocation of the fund’s budget. That is, each recipient country choses αj to maximize their
utility, taking as given the allocation rule (6) of the donor countries and the investment
decisions of the other recipient countries. This optimization problem yields
αj = max{1;
√
2x
βjβi
β21 + β
2
2
} ∀j (9)
Proposition 1
Reform investment is always (weakly) greater when aid is allocated through a fund.
Proposition 1 details the main insight of the analysis: When aid is allocated through
a joint fund, the bargaining process induces competition between the recipient countries.
They thus have an incentive to invest in reforms in order to secure a larger share of the
budget. Such competition cannot be induced through bilateral aid when donor countries
are biased over the allocation of aid.
It is interesting to consider some comparative statics of the reform effort of recipient
countries.
Corollary 1
Reform effort is increasing in the fund’s budget.
This result is straightforward: The larger the pie recipient countries are now directly
competing over, the higher the incentive to invest in reforms that will secure a larger part
of the total aid budget.
Corollary 2
Reform effort is (weakly) decreasing in asymmetry between the donor countries’ valuations
βi.
To see this, it helps to rewrite expression 9 in terms of the ratio B = β1
β2
:
αj =
√
2x
B
1 +B2
(10)
αj is maximized when B = 1 and decreases as one moves away from β1 = β2 in
either direction. Thus, a recipient country’s incentives to invest in order to increase its
aid share are higher the more equal the exogenously given donor valuations β are. Once
donor countries are asymmetric in their own valuations, recipient country 1’s investment
incentives decrease - either because it is expensive to “catch up” with the other country’s
higher ex-ante valuation (in case β1 < β2), or because it is unnecessary to invest more,
since country 2 finds it too expensive to catch up (in case β1 > β2).
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2.3 Equilibrium Decision: Which donor prefers the fund?
Lastly, we consider the choice of donor countries of whether join an aid fund or to allocate
its aid budget bilaterally: The optimal decision comes from comparing payoffs under each
scenario, based on the anticipation of the donor countries regarding how the fund will
influence the investment decisions of the recipient countries. Donor country i will find it
optimal to join the fund (fi = 1) when:
Fi =
1
2
[αiβi
√
gi + αjβj
√
gj] + λδi − βi
√
x (11)
=
1
2
α
√
2x
β2i + β
2
j√
β2i + β
2
j
+ λδ − βi
√
x ≥ 0. (12)
This comparison involves the following trade-off: Through joining the fund, the donor
country increases the level of investment, δi, chosen by the recipient country, but at the
same time commits to equally share the utility surplus from aid spending among the
donors. Both of these considerations depend on the level of asymmetry in βs as well as
the size of the overall budget.
Proposition 2
When donor countries are symmetric (β1 = β2), it is optimal for both donor countries to
commit their aid budgets to an international aid fund (fi = 1 for i = 1, 2).
With symmetric βs, the equilibrium allocation of funds is exactly equal to the allo-
cation under bilateral aid (i.e. each project receives x). Thus, there is only the upside of
increased investments in α, which makes the fund always (weakly) more attractive than
bilateral aid.
Proposition 3
When donor countries are not symmetric, holding βj constant, there exists a cut-off level
of βi, β
′, such that for βi > β′, donor country i sets fi = 0 (i prefers bilateral aid over
joining the fund).
Proposition 3 illustrates that when the donor countries biases are asymmetric, then
the decision to commit to allocate aid via the fund is costly to the donor country with
the greater bias. If this asymmetry is high enough, then the country with the higher bias
will prefer to allocate aid bilaterally. Note, however, that this result only depends on the
relative size, rather than the absolute size, of the β’s.
9
3 Optimal Voting Rule
In the previous section, we assume the fund uses a decision rule of unanimity to determine
the allocation of the budget. However, since the decision rule used by the donor countries
may impact the investment decisions of the recipient countries, it need not be the case
that unanimity is ex ante Pareto optimal (see for example Harstad, 2005, and Maggi and
Morreli, 2006). In this section, we explore the optimal voting rule by characterizing the
effect of a majority decision rule on the investment decisions of the recipient countries.
3.1 Model
Here we extend the model to incorporate majority decision making in the spirit of Harstad
(2005), where an endogenously chosen majority coalition determines the allocation of
the fund. For reasons of tractability and to highlight the effect of majority rule on
competition, we consider the case of three donor countries and three partner counties
and assume symmetry in spillovers (βi = βj).
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We model the majority decision rule as follows: After recipient countries choose in-
vestment levels and {αj} is revealed, a donor country is randomly chosen as formateur,
f (each country has an equal probability of being chosen). The formateur then selects a
majority coalition, which bargains over project funding and utility transfers in a manner
analogous to our baseline model. Since the majority coalition is chosen endogenously, the
formateur will select the majority coalition that maximizes her expected utility; if the
formateur is indifferent regarding which countries to include in the majority coalition,
she chooses each country with equal probability. We also assume that utility transfers
are restricted to the majority coalition, which implies that countries outside the majority
coalition are not fully expropriated. Therefore, the bargaining outcome within the ma-
jority coalition is equivalent to the two-country bargaining outcome, given a budget of
3x.
Additionally, to make the analysis tractable, we consider a stochastic investment
technology. Specifically, we restrict each recipient countries’ project to be either high
quality, αj = α
h, or low quality, αj = α
l < αh. For ease of exposition, we set αl = 1.
The quality of the project is in turn a stochastic function of the level investment chosen
by country i, δj ∈ [0, 1]. Specifically:
p(αj = α
h|δj) = δj.
Each recipient country faces the same cost function, c(δj) = δ
2
j .
We assume that the indirect benefit of investment continues to be proportional to the
4This analysis characterizes the optimal q-rule, since in the sub-majority case recipient countries will have
no incentive to invest.
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level of investment, δj. Conceptually, this is consistent with our example of investment in
good governance: in the stochastic case, decreasing corruption increases the probability
that a recipient country’s project realizes as high quality; the decrease in corruption,
however, is enjoyed whether or not αj is equal to α
h or αl.
Formally, the stochastic model is analogous in expectation to the deterministic model,
given that a marginal increase in the recipient country’s investment increases the ex-
pected quality linearly. However, in contrast to the deterministic case, the stochastic
model allows for pure strategy equilibria under majority rule, since it avoids an “open set
problem” in which recipient countries have an incentive to set marginally higher levels
of investments than their peers to ensure that they are chosen to the majority coalition
(only mixed-strategy investment strategies exist in equilibrium under majority rule in the
deterministic case).
To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. recipient countries choose investment levels, δj.
2. {αj} realizes.
3. A donor country is randomly chosen as formateur, f .
4. The formateur selects a majority coalition, M.
5. The majority coalition bargains over the allocation of project funding and utility
transfers.
We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria, where all target nations choose the
same level of investment, and all donor nations use a symmetric decision rule conditional
upon being selected as the formateur.
An equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1
An equilibrium under Majority Rule consists of an investment level, δj = δ
m, and a
decision rule, ν, that maps {αj} into a majority coalition M, where:
1. Given ν and δk 6=j = δm, δj = δm maximizes E[gj − c(δj)|δ] for each j ∈ P .
2. Given {αj}, ν maximizes ui(gj, {αj}, βj}) for each i ∈ D given that {gi} is set by
NB within the majority coalition.
That is, for this section, we consider the objective of donor countries to maximize their
expected utility.
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3.2 Analysis
We begin by characterizing the expected allocation to gj under unanimity in the stochastic
investment model:
E[gj|δj, {δ}]u =p(Ah = 0|δu)
[
δjg
h,l,l + (1− δj)gl,l,l
]
+p(Ah = 1|δu)
[
δjg
h,h,l + (1− δj)gl,l,h
]
+p(Ah = 2|δu)
[
δjg
h,h,h + (1− δj)gl,h,h
]
,
where gz,y,w = (αz)2/((αz)2 +(αy)2 +(αw)2)3x is the three-country allocation that results
from NB.
Next, we consider the expected allocation to gj under majority. Following backward
induction, we first specify the equilibrium decision-rule ν.
Lemma 4
The equilibrium decision-rule, ν, specifies that the formateur selects a majority coalition,
M, equal to {f, i}, where αi is the maximum element of the set {αi}\αf . If the maximum
is not unique, i is chosen randomly.
Since bargaining entails that the majority coalition’s surplus is split equally, the formateur
maximizes her utility by selecting a majority coalition consisting of herself and the country
with highest αj, since this maximizes the size of the majority coalition’s surplus.
Lemma 4 implies that, from country j’s perspective, the fund’s allocation rule under
majority is a function of the number of recipient countries, other than j, that have a
high-quality project. We denote this value as Ah =
∑k∈P\j 1 (αk = αh). This allows us
to characterize the expected allocation to gj as a function of δj, given the investment
decision of the other two countries (δm):
E[gj|δj, {δ}]m =p(Ah = 0|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,l + (1− δj)gl,l
]
+
2
3
[
δjg
h,l + (1− δj)1
2
gl,l
])
+p(Ah = 1|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,h + (1− δj)gl,h
]
+
2
3
[
1
2
(δjg
h,h +
1
2
(1− δj)gl,h) + 1
2
δjg
h,h
])
+p(Ah = 2|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,h + (1− δj)gl,h
]
+
2
3
[
1
2
δjg
h,h
])
,
where gz,y = (αz)2/((αz)2+(αy)2)3x is the bargaining solution from the majority coalition,
which is equal to the two-country bargaining solution with {αz, αy}.
For each realization of Ah, the above expression divides E[gj] into the case where i = j
is chosen to be the formateur (the first term in brackets on each line) and the case where
i = j is not the formateur (the second term in brackets). Note that when i = j is chosen
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as the formateur, the expression for E[gj|δj, {δ}] is analogous to the case of unanimity
– therefore, the difference between the incentive to invest under the two decision rules
stems from the case in which i = j is not chosen as the formateur. In this case, the
probability that i = j is selected into the majority coalition, and hence receives a positive
level of gj is increasing in δj, since Lemma 4 specifies that the formateur will always select
the country with a higher level of project quality. This gives j two incentives to invest
under majority rule: (1) to increase expected gj, conditional upon i = j being selected to
the majority coalition, and (2) to increase the probability of i = j being selected to the
majority coalition.
The addition of incentive (2) under majority rule leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4
The equilibrium level of investment under majority rule, δm, is weakly greater than the
level of investment under unanimity rule, δu.
Proposition 4 follows from the first-order conditions of E[gj|δj, {δ}] and is formally proved
in the appendix. The result is also illustrated visually in figure 1 for a fixed x (x = 2).
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
αh
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
δ
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
αh
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
δm-δu
Figure 1: δm and δu (dashed line) for x = 2.
While Proposition 4 implies that investment levels are higher under majority rule
for low levels of αh, it does not imply that majority rule always outperforms unanimity
rule. Instead, under majority rule, there is a tradeoff between higher investment and a
utility loss that stems from the fact that majority rule limits funding to the two recipient
countries in the majority coalition, and from the concavity of utility over g. This tradeoff
is formalized in the following proposition, which considers the utility difference between
the two decision rules holding x fixed and varying αh:
Proposition 5
There exists λ∗, such that iff λ > λ∗, there exist an interval (αl, α′] for some α′ > αl such
that the expected utility of the donor countries is higher under majority than unanimity
for αh ∈ (αl, α′].
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The intuition for this result lies in the fact that under unanimity rule, as αh → αl,
the incentive to invest approaches zero for the recipient countries, since gj approaches x
for any αj. Under majority rule, however, the incentive to invest stays strictly positive,
since any country with αj = αl is more likely to be left out of the majority coalition
and receive gj = 0. Therefore, as αh → αl, δu → 0 while δm → 1/4x > 0. However, as
αh → αl, the direct benefit of investment (to the donor countries) also approaches zero,
while the utility cost of restricting the budget allocation to two countries stays strictly
positive. Therefore, for majority rule to dominate unanimity at low αh, it must be the
case that the indirect benefit of investment outweighs this utility cost.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
1.5
2.0
2.5
E[ud]
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
E[ud]
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
E[ud]
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
E[ud]m-E[ud]u
λ = 0.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.05
E[ud]m-E[ud]u
λ = 0.5.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
αh
-0.1
0.1
0.2
E[ud]m-E[ud]u
λ = 1.
Figure 2: E[ud]
m and E[ud]
u (dashed line) for x = 2.
This result is also illustrated by figure 2, which shows the utility difference under the
two voting rules for different values of λ. Note that utility difference between majority
rule and unanimity rule is the highest at an interior value of αh. The utility difference is
increasing initially since, as αh increases, the direct benefit of higher investment increases.
However, as αh increases, the difference in the investment levels under majority and
unanimity also decreases.5 Therefore, for high enough levels of αh, the utility difference
between the two decision rules is decreasing, resulting in an interior maximum.6
Lastly, we interpret these results in more general context: In the stochastic model,
5At high enough levels of αh; by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, both δm and δu approach min{1, 2x/(2+x)} as αh →∞.
6Also, note that figure 2 demonstrates that a range of αh where majority outperforms unanimity need
not exist. In fact, simulations show that if λ = 0, then unanimity is preferable to majority for all x, αh.
With a higher budget, the benefit of higher partner-county investment increases; however, the incentive
to invest also increases, decreasing the difference in investment levels between majority and unanimity
– with symmetric βjs and λ = 0, the later effect dominates and unanimity is optimal for the donor
countries.
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decreasing αh corresponds to decreasing the benefit of higher investment. Therefore, the
result that majority rule can dominated unanimity rule for low levels of αh corresponds
to the statement that majority rule is the optimal voting rule when the direct benefit of
partner-country investment is low. The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
when the direct benefit of higher investment to the donor countries is relatively low,
then the incentive to invest that is generated by collective allocation is relatively weak.
Therefore, a majority rule is preferable in these cases, since it provides an additional
incentive for recipient countries to invest to ensure that their donor country is selected
to the majority coalition.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a formal model of the allocation of aid spending in an envi-
ronment where donor countries face a bias over which recipient countries receive funding.
Our analysis provides several important insights regarding the optimal design of inter-
national aid organizations. As highlighted by Svensson (2000, 2003), international aid
organizations must focus on distributing aid in a manner that provides an incentive for
developing nations to invest in reform. However, given competing national and special
party interests, the question is how to enforce this objective. Here, we show that compe-
tition in the area of reform can arise endogenously when donor countries directly bargain
over the allocation of aid funds, and that this competition is intensified under majority
rule, as recipient countries invest in reform to increases the probability that their project
will be selected by the endogenous majority coalition.
We emphasize that the predictions of our model only apply to international aid funds
that allocate aid spending via an unstructured bargaining process. In recent years, “ear-
marked” donations (aka multi-bi aid) have become increasingly common as donor coun-
tries seek to take advantage of the benefits of scale of international organizations, while
ensuring that aid is distributed according to national priorities. However, as our paper
shows, earmarking diminishes the incentive of recipient countries to invest in reforms,
since it circumvents multilateral bargaining. Therefore, in this case, less structure can
result in greater efficiency.
Lastly, in future research we hope to consider the role of competition between mul-
tilateral organizations. Given the proliferation of climate change aid funds, competition
has arguably arisen over funding the best projects. While the effect of such competition
may be beneficial when the quality of the set of projects is exogenous, the effect of com-
petition on endogenous quality is unclear. More research is needed to clarify the effect of
the “market structure” of multilateral organizations on recipient countries’ incentives to
invest in reform.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1: Since country i does not value spending on gj, it has no incentive to
spend there. There is also no alternative productive use for the aid budget, so all xi is
spent on gi. 
Proof of Lemma 2: The first order conditions for problem 4 are:
αiβi√
gi
= ν ∀i (13)
g1 + g2 = x (14)
where ν is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. They yield the optimal
allocation rule in the fund:
gi =
(αiβi)
2
(α1β1)2 + (α2β2)2
2x (15)
g1 + g2 = 2x. (16)

Proof of Lemma 3: Since reforms are costly and do not change the allocation of aid,
target countries choose the minimum level αj = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Target countries move simultaneously, so we are looking for Nash
equilibria. Each target country solves the stated problem, taking as given the other’s
reform investment level. This gives us two best response functions:
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1 = 2xα2i
(β1β2)
2
((α1β1)2 + (α2β2)2)2
∀i, (17)
Setting these two best response functions, for j = i, k, equal to each other and
simplifying gives the result that α1 = α2 = α, and thus
α =
√
2x
β1β2
β21 + β
2
2
(18)
There exist parameter combinations for which α < 1, in which case target countries
must choose the minimum investment level αi = 1. This particularly concerns small
budgets of x < 2. There clearly also exist parameter combinations where α > 1, so
that it can be concluded that investment is always weakly larger than under bilateral
allocation. 
Proof of Corollary 1: The partial derivative of α with respect to x is positive. Since the
true implemented α cannot fall below the minimum required investment of 1, α is not
increasing in x until x > 2. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Rewrite α in terms of the ratio B = β1
β2
:
α =
√
2x
B
1 +B2
(19)
α is maximized when B = 1. The necessary and sufficient conditions, respectively,
are:
∂α
∂B
=
√
2x
1−B2
(1 +B2)2
= 0 (20)
→B = 1 (21)
and
∂2
∂2B
=
√
2x
−2B(1 +B2)2 − (1−B2)2(1 +B2)2B
(1 +B2)4
(22)
→ at B = 1 ∂
2
∂2B
< 0 (23)
For B < 1, an increase in B corresponds to a decrease in asymmetry, for B > 1 an
increase in B corresponds to an increase in asymmetry. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Replacing β1 = β2 = β in equation (12) yields the surplus for
each donor nation from joining the fund:
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F =
1
2
α
√
2x
2β2√
2β2
+ λ(α− 1)− β√x (24)
= (
√
xβ + λ)(α− 1) ≥ 0, (25)
since α ≥ 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we consider the case where α = 1 (δ = 0). In this case,
there is no advantage from the fund in terms of increased investment incentives. Without
loss of generality, assume βi ≥ βj. At βi = βj, the allocation of funds will be exactly the
same as under bilateral aid:
gi = 2x
β2i
β2i + β
2
j
(26)
β1 = β2 → gi = x, (27)
so that both countries should be indifferent between the two forms of aid allocation.
Indeed, for α = 1 and β1 = β2
Fi =
1
2
α[β1
√
g1 + β2
√
g2]− βi
√
x (28)
=
1
2
2β
√
x− β√x = 0. (29)
It then remains to be shown that the surplus from joining a fund, F, is larger than
zero for country i whenever βi < βj and smaller than zero otherwise. To see that, it
suffices to show that the derivative of F with respect to βi is less than zero everywhere:
∂Fi
∂βi
=
1
2
√
2x
2βi
√
β2i + β
2
j −
βi(β
2
i+β
2
j )√
β2i+β
2
j√
β2i + β
2
j
2 −
√
x (30)
=
√
x
[√
2
2
βi√
β2i + β
2
j
− 1
]
< 0 (31)
(32)
Thus, when α = 1 (δ = 0), the donor country with the higher bias (i) will prefer to
allocate aid bilaterally, and set fi = 0.
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Next, note that since α = max{1,√2x βiβj
β2i+β
2
j
}, and since:
lim
βi→∞
√
2x
βiβj
β2i + β
2
j
= 0,
by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, there exists β′ such that βi ≥ β′ implies α = 1, which proves the
result. 
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof Lemma 4: First note that the formateur will always select herself to the majority
coalition, since the payoff of belonging to the majority coalition is strictly positive and
utility transfers are restricted to the majority coalition. Since NB prescribes an equal
split of the utility surplus, the utility of the formateur is equal to 1/2S, where S =∑
i∈M αig
NB
i . And since NB results in the set of {gj} that maximizes S, S({αf , αh}) >
S({αf , αl}). This implies that f has a strictly dominant strategy of selecting M = {f, i}
with αi = αh over M = {f, i′} with αi′ = αl. Lastly, by assumption, f randomizes
i ∈M, i 6= f if the maximal element of {αi}\αf is not unique. 
Proof Proposition 4: Each partner country sets δj to maximize its expected utility, equal
to:
E[u(δj, {δ})]q = E[gj|δj, {δ}]q − δ2j ,
where q corresponds to the decision rule. The expected allocations are repeated here for
convenience.
E[gj|δj, {δ}]u =p(Ah = 0|δu)
[
δjg
h,l,l + (1− δj)gl,l,l
]
+p(Ah = 1|δu)
[
δjg
h,h,l + (1− δj)gl,l,h
]
+p(Ah = 2|δu)
[
δjg
h,h,h + (1− δj)gl,h,h
]
,
E[gj|δj, {δ}]m =p(Ah = 0|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,l + (1− δj)gl,l
]
+
2
3
[
δjg
h,l + (1− δj)1
2
gl,l
])
+p(Ah = 1|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,h + (1− δj)gl,h
]
+
2
3
[
1
2
(δjg
h,h +
1
2
(1− δj)gl,h) + 1
2
δjg
h,h
])
+p(Ah = 2|δm)
(
1
3
[
δjg
h,h + (1− δj)gl,h
]
+
2
3
[
1
2
δjg
h,h
])
,
After taking the first-order conditions of E[u(δj, {δ})]q, imposing symmetry in the
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investment decisions, and simplifying, we get the following equation, which implicitly
characterizes an interior solution for δu:
2δ = (1− δu)2(ghll − x)+ 2(1− δu)δu(ghhl − gllh)+ (δu)2(x− glhh). (33)
And for δm:
2δ = (1− δm)2
(
ghl − x
)
+ 2(1− δm)δm
(
1
6
ghl + x− 1
2
glh
)
+ (δm)2
(
x− 1
3
glh
)
. (34)
Equation 33 implies that δu is characterized by:
δu = min
{
1,
((αh)2 − 1)(2(αh)2 + 1)x
2 + 5(αh)2 + 2(αh)4 + ((αh)2 − 1)2x
}
, (35)
while equation 34 implies that δm is characterized by:
δm = min
{
1,
(2(αh)2 − 1)x
2 + 2(αh)2 + ((αh)2 − 1)x
}
. (36)
Deriving an analytical proof that δm > δu is cumbersome, however, equations 35 and
36 can easily be used to verify the result numerically (code available on request). 
Proof Proposition 5: Define δd(αh) as:
δd(αh) = δm(αh)− δu(αh).
Since both equation 35 and equation 36 are continuous at αh = 1, it follows that
limαh→αl δd(αh) = δd(1), which simplifies to δd(1) = x/4. Moreover, as αh → αl, the
NB allocations, gz,y,w and gz,y, approach x and 3/2x, respectively, regardless of {αj}.
Together, these two results imply that the difference in the donor country’s expected
utility under majority and unanimity, as αh → αl is equal to:
E[ud]m − E[ud]u = −αl
[
x
1
2 − 2
3
(
3
2
x
) 1
2
]
+ λ
(
x
4
)
,
where the first term reflects the utility loss from allocating X over two projects only,
and the second term reflects the indirect utility benefit of the higher investment under
majority rule (the direct benefit approaches zero as αh → αl). Clearly, donors’ expected
utility is greater under majority rule in a neighborhood of αh = αl if, and only if:
λ >
4αl
[
1− 2
3
(
3
2
) 1
2
]
x
1
2
.

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